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PSYCHIATRIC CRIMINOLOGY: IS IT A VALID MARRIAGE?
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
HAROLD

P. GRASER*

P

ROFESSOR HALL, in his provocative paper, acknowledges that there exists
a marriage between Law and Psychiatry, but he seems to be searching to
see if there should be an annulment. There is enough unhappiness in the marriage that "something must be done," but there also seems to be enough worth in
the union that I would recommend a vigorous program of joint psychotherapy,
rather than a dissolution.
A first step toward successful therapy is to elicit at least an understanding
of the minimal needs of each discipline and then an effort to successfully communicate these needs, each to the other.
Professor Hall has defined the essential requirements for a criminal law
acceptable to the lawyer, namely: (1) the principle of legality; (2) the intent
to commit the act; (3) the act itself; (4) the sanction.
Major problems, as related to psychiatry, are concerned with the aspect
of intent, and with the problem of fitting the psychiatric concept of determinism
into the legal framework. The psychiatrist is charged with evaluating the
accused to determine if he has the substantial capacity to possess a criminal
intent. In most jurisdictions this requires an answer to the question "is the
defendant idiotic, imbecilic, or insane to the extent he can or cannot form an
intent and know how to carry it through?" The psychiatrist working with the
lawyer very soon meets the assertion that "given normal intelligence there will
be normal control of conduct."'
It is true that variations in intelligence will determine whether a crime
is committed in a clever or in a blundering manner, but intelligence is not the
significant factor in determining if behavior will be criminal or socially acceptable. Problems with normal intelligence or cognitive defects, as these phrases
are used in the law and are being used in this paper, will include memory,
orientation, retention and recall, and all of the factors included in what the
psychiatrists call sensorium. If these defects are severe, the individual not only
cannot have the required criminal intent, but would probably not be capable
of carrying out the crime. The other psychopathological manifestations that
cause the major problem (and which I feel are not nearly as unformulated as
Dr. Diamond alleges) 2 include motivation, ideation, and volition. It is defects
in these areas that place their bearers in such categories as sociopath, schizophrenic, character disorder, and neurotic, and it is in quantifying these defects
* M.D.; Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, State University of New York
at Buffalo, School of Medicine.
1. Spoken of by Professor Hall as being generally accepted; see Hall, Psychiatric
Criminology: Is it a Valid Marriage? The Legal View, supra p. 356.
2. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens and Beyond, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 189 (1962).
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that the significant difficulty occurs. Not only is there no satisfactory measuring
instrument, but function changes under conditions of stress. Furthermore, and
most important, what constitutes a stress is not definable in a specific manner
so it can be written into a statute, but rather is unique to each individual. This is
a fact lawyers and juries find most difficult to accept.
These points lead to the "clash" of experts, but the dash, does not usually
represent any wide divergence of views. Instead it reflects the difficulty of both
judging and trying to quantify at least three variables: (1) the specific defect
of motivation, ideation, or volition; (2) the specifics of what is stressful for
the individual defendant; (3) the degree of stress at a time remote from the
examination. The legal necessity of stating "with reasonable medical certainty" that the defendant is or is not substantially capable requires that a
judgment be made. Two opinions may be extremely similar and yet provide
opposite answers.
An illustration of this problem is the most accurate measurement available
of a mental attribute, namely the IQ score. At some point there must 'be
assigned a definition of mental deficiency. No matter how one struggles to
conceptualize the problem, legal necessity requires a definite "yes" or "no" answer which can just as well be symbolized as a number which marks the point
between yes and no. If 70 is assigned as the cutoff point, an IQ of 69 indicates
mental deficiency. An individual with an IQ of 70 is innocent of being mentally
defective. An individual with an IQ of 69 is guilty.
No one designing tests or using tests has the slightest belief that there
is any profound difference between an IQ of 69 and an IQ of 70 or the slightest
doubt that on different days with a different examiner, or under different conditions of stress, the 69 could be a 74 or a 64; yet somehow the experts, the
advocates and the judge must help the jury evolve a verdict that is the equivalent of an exact number, not plus or minus five. The jury must say 69-guilty;
or 70-innocent.
To continue the analogy, it is fortunate that most people do not fall into
this area. It is no problem to assign an IQ of 50 to the defective group and an
IQ of 115 to the nondefective group.
The elements of insanity are not as measurable as the elements of "idiotic
or imbecilic," but there is the same kind of continuum with an area clearly sane
and an area clearly insane. In fact, the experts do agree on the majority of
defendants as being either clearly sane or clearly insane. It is this gray area,
that can never be defined or refined away, that will continue to cause conflict
as long as we wish to maintain, as a legal test, that the defendant must have
substantial capacity to form intent.
This concept of a continuum from clearly sane to dearly insane, with its
gray area where experts clash can also be used to focus on the concept of "determinism." As a practical matter, the person far along toward the "sick" end of
the continuum, does indeed fit very well into the conceptual model of having

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
his actions wholly determined by unconscious forces. As one moves along the
continuum toward the "healthy" or "normal" or "sane" end of the spectrum,
at least a sufficiently significant amount of behavior is free of unconscious
dictate to allow the "free will" choice of behavior and allow the psychiatric
view to be comfortably aligned with the legal usage of responsibility.
I should now like to comment on the assertion "all criminals are mentally
diseased, every crime was irresistible; there is no difference between deliberate
harm-doing and negligent damage or even accidents and so on."8
This view concerns itself with the same fundamental problem currently
extensively argued by the psychiatrist, Thomas Szasz. He takes the view that
mental illness is a myth, that everyone is responsible, that no one should be
excused from the consequences of his acts, and that no one should be deprived
of liberty only because he is mentally ill. There should be no involuntary
patients and no restraint of the mentally ill except for an act prohibited by
law.4 I believe, in essence, he would eliminate the "intent" aspect of the four
points outlined by Professor Hall. There are other social scientists who would
eliminate the sanction aspect, or at least the punishment dimension of the
sanction and substitute rehabilitation.
These ideals are currently reflected in a number of laws and opinions
and are being implemented in various ways.
In our own state, the sexual psychopath law5 has been in effect for over a
decade. This allows a sentence of one day to life or, in effect, provides a sentence
for being "dangerous" instead of a precise sentence for a precisely proscribed
harm.
In 1962, a California law making the status of being a drug addict a crime
was struck down by the United States Supreme Court. 6 The Court did suggest
that "in the interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants, a State
might establish a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program might require periods of involuntary confinement." 7
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, noted that "the addict is a sick person. He may,
of course, be confined for treatment or for the protection of society. Cruel and
unusual punishment results not from confinement but from convicting the addict
of a crime." 8
In March of last year the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled unanimously that chronic alcoholics must be treated as victims of a disease, not as
criminals.9 New York State, in step with these pronouncements does, have a
civil commitment statute for chronic alcoholics as well as the drug addict.' 0
3.
4.
5.

Hall, supra note 1, at 394; Dr. Hall goes on to criticize this view also.
See generally Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness (1961).
See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1950, ch. 525.

6. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
7. Id. at 665.

8. Id. at 676.
9. Driver v. H1innant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).

10. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 423; cf. id. § 307.
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A narcotic addict, in New York State, caught with illegal drugs can now be
provided with an extensive, and I might add, expensive rehabilitation program.
The alcoholic rehabilitation program is not yet as well organized. It has recently
become a crime to possess sedatives or stimulents in improper containers."1 The
possessors of these drugs can be arrested but even if addicted there is no treatment program for these addicts.' 2
These trends of the law are due, at least in part, to the growing theoretical
view that behavior is largely a culturally determined learning process modified
by the unique indoctrination of each set of parents or parent figures and the
varying biological capacities of the individual. The value systems, character
structure, and even the neurotic and psychotic behavior patterns are learned
much like a language. Language, including accent patterns, slang patterns
and intonation patterns, is "determined" by the environmental situation which
can be used in various ways by each individual. Life patterns, like languange
patterns, can be understood and modified; the law seems to be saying it doesn't
matter if they are labelled "criminal" or "sick"--there are patterns of behavior
which are unacceptable. In the interest of the general health and welfare of
its inhabitants, the state is going to establish compulsory treatment program
involving involuntary confinement for a sufficient time to teach a living pattern
within acceptable limits.
Even now nearly thirty-three percent of those in New York State correction institutions have a history of drug use. About ninety-six percent of the inmates had some sexual experience, and each person has had an experience which
was illegal under some statute.13 We may indeed soon be able to fit all of
those now confined in correctional institutions into one of these newly evolving
treatment-rehabilitation-indeterminate sentence programs, and reach the state
that, depending on one's view, can be called ideal or dangerous; namely, there
will be crime with no punishment. We will be left with the principle of legality
and of action assigned to the law, the problem of intent and sanction assigned
to the social scientist.
11. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3383.
12. Thus, if addicted, it behooves one to choose the right drug.
13. Cf. Kinsey, Pomeroy & Martin, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1948).

